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THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WILLIAM FUNK TO AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP
by
William D. Araiza*
This Essay discusses the contributions of Professor William Funk to American
constitutional law scholarship on the occasion ofafestschrift held in his honor
at Lewis &' Clark Law School on April 5, 2019. Reviewing Professor Funk '
varied scholarship reveals his carefu, attentive, and even-handed approach.
The Essay concludes by comparing Professor Funk ' style of constitutional law
scholarship to the approach to substantive due process embraced by Justice Da-
vid Souter in his classic concurring opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg.
Just like Justice Souter's analysis in Glucksberg, Professor Funk's scholarship
seeks justification for rules in the results they generate, rejects arid all-or-noth-
ing approaches to constitutional principle, an4 even while acknowledging the
imperative of legal evolution, recognizes that the surest foundations of such
evolution lay in what had come before. This comparison reveals the great value
ofProfessor Funk ' contributions to the American constitutional project ofcre-
ating a system that fairly balances the imperatives of order and liberty.
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Over the course of his academic career, Professor Funk has written extensively
on environmental, administrative, and constitutional law.' Indeed, his administra-
tive law scholarship-not just in the form of standard law review articles,2 but also
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Essay is based on remarks delivered at the
Festschrift marking Professor Funk's scholarship. Thanks to Lewis & Clark Law School for
inviting my participation in that event. Thanks as well to Jedediah Tifft for his fine research
assistance.
' See Law Faculty: William Funk, LEWIS & CLARK L. SCH., https://law.Iclark.edu/live/profiles/
276-william-funk (last visited Oct. 11, 2019) (providing a list of scholarship spanning these areas).
2 For a very brief sample of Professor Funk's administrative law scholarship published in law
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in casebooks' and practitioner sourcebooks 4-has marked him as an exceptionally
influential participant in the ongoing debate about the American administrative
state. The fact that Professor Funk's work has a substantive focus on environmental
law only increases his influence over administrative law, given the well-known, if
nevertheless contested "argument that environmental law is properly understood
and treated as a subspecies of administrative law."5
But Professor Funk's constitutional law scholarship deserves its due. Over the
course of his career, Professor Funk has written prolifically and broadly about con-
stitutional law issues that go beyond issues implicating the constitutional status of
the administrative state. Among other topics, his scholarship has considered the Due
Process and Fourth Amendment implications of targeted drone strikes against
American citizens abroad;6 limits on domestic surveillance undertaken for foreign
intelligence-gathering purposes;7 the Takings Clause, both generally8 and in its re-
lationship to so-called regulatory exactions; 9 standing to sue;10 the First Amend-
ment;]' and the Commerce Clause, both in its affirmative' 2 and dormant 3 dimen-
sions. Moreover, by writing casebooks,1 4 Professor Funk has made his mark across
reviews, see, for example, William Funk, Slip Slidin'Away: The Erosion ofAPA Adjudication, 122
PENN ST. L. REV. 141 (2017); William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in
Administrative Law-Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (2009); William
Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321 (2001).
' See WILLIAM FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (6th ed. 2018).
4 See, e.g., WILLIAM FUNK & JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
SOURCEBOOK (5th ed. 2016).
Michael Burger, Environmental Law/Environmental Literature, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9
(2013). But see id. at 9 n.27 (citing differing views on this question).
6 William Funk, Deadly Drones, Due Process, and the Fourth Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 311 (2013).
7 William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism in the United States, 80 Miss. L.J. 1491
(2011) [hereinafter Funk, Electronic Surveillance].
' William Funk, Revolution or Restatement? Awaiting Answers to Lucas' Unanswered
Questions, 23 ENvTL. L. 891 (1993).
9 William Funk, Reading Dolan v. Tigard, 25 ENVTL. L. 127 (1995) [hereinafter Funk,
Reading Dolan].
10 William Funk, Standing Without Injury?, TRIAL, Mar. 2012, at 54.
" William Funk, Intimidation and the Internet, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 579 (2006)
[hereinafter Funk, Intimidation].
12 William Funk, The Lopez Report, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 1998, at 1.
15 William Funk, Constitutional Implications ofRegional CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs: The
Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
353 (2009).
14 See WILLIAM FUNK, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE
AND RIGHTS (2014); WILLIAM FUNK, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE (2008).
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every constitutional law topic that is typically covered in standard first-year consti-
tutional law classes.
Professor Funk's writings have not merely been numerous and broad; they have
been careful, and, to reclaim a term that has perhaps been corroded, his scholarship
has been fair and balanced. Indeed, one could justifiably conclude that Professor
Funk's constitutional law scholarship reflects an administrative lawyer's concern for
detail, rationality, and procedural care. Parts I through III of this Essay will each
examine a particular piece of his writing and explain how it features those charac-
teristics. Part IV will identify common threads in Professor Funk's scholarship. Part
V will conclude by considering the usefulness and importance of Professor Funk's
work in the long-term project of American scholarly thinking about our Constitu-
tion and constitutionalism more generally.
I. DOMESTIC ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
In 2011, Professor Funk wrote an article considering the constitutional issues
lurking in domestic electronic surveillance performed for counter-terrorism pur-
poses.' 5 Beyond providing a nuanced history of the legal regime governing such
surveillance, 16 that article's analysis steers a careful line between the government's
legitimate need for covert investigatory tools and the potential for government abuse
of the counter-terrorism justification to skirt traditional Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirements.1 7 As Professor Funk notes, the problem is a difficult one, given
the increasingly blurred line separating domestic law enforcement, which is unques-
tionably subject to Fourth Amendment requirements, from what amounts to war-
time surveillance of a foreign enemy, where the Fourth Amendment's applicability
and meaning are much more contested.' 8 His analysis also notes the practical reality
that intelligence-gathering abroad may be more difficult than analogous conduct
I5 Funk, Electronic Surveillance, supra note 7.
16 Id. at 1492-501.
17 Id. at 1503 ("The issue here is less whether FISA as amended is constitutional according
to established constitutional doctrine massaged in the inimitable American way, but rather the
questions it raises about the nature of the struggle against international terrorism and the
appropriate means to combat that terrorism consistent with retaining the individual freedoms
citizens of developed nations have come to expect.").
1 Id. at 1500-01 ("So long as foreign intelligence surveillance was aimed at pure foreign
intelligence, traditional counter-intelligence, or even international terrorism accomplished abroad
against non-United States targets, drawing the intelligence/law enforcement line was generally not
problematical, because criminal prosecution was rarely the sought-for goal. However, the shift of
international terrorism from non-United States targets abroad to domestic targets and United
States targets abroad changed the nature of the problem. Now, criminal prosecution, or at least
incarceration or incapacitation, was likely to be the primary goal, although the gathering of
intelligence regarding the terrorists' contacts, plans, and infrastructure was also extremely
important." (footnote omitted)).
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carried out domestically.19 Given that difference, Professor Funk suggests-quite
appropriately-that the government should be given more leeway when it acts to
gather information abroad, even if that information-gathering implicates U.S. citi-
zens.20
This emphasis on practicality is also evident in Professor Funk's acknowledge-
ment of the political realities underlying government action in this area. Thus, he
observes that the political decision to take a war footing when confronting al-Qaeda
triggers a different set of defaults when considering the information-gathering is-
sue.21 Similarly, Professor Funk cautions readers that courts will likely not overturn
a bipartisan decision reflecting a balancing of intelligence-gathering and civil liber-
ties concerns, especially when, as with the Patriot Act, the governing law includes a
sunset provision that, in his words, "required it to be reconsidered in the future,
under calmer conditions." 22 In those words one can almost hear Justice Jackson
cautioning as he did in Korematsu v. United States that courts cannot be expected to
prevent infringement on civil liberties when, in times of emergency, the people en-
trust their leaders with the urgent task of national defense. 23
Thus, Professor Funk's article reflects the granular distinctions between differ-
ent situations triggering government surveillance, concedes the difficulty of the issue
and the unhelpfulness of all-or-nothing rules, and recognizes the importance of
practical realities in finding a resolution. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, his
analysis cautions that courts cannot be expected to stand in the way of national
9 Id. at 1505 ("Given the reduced capability of the government to obtain information
abroad short of surveillance, compared to the capabilities to obtain information through less
intrusive techniques in the United States, more flexibility regarding surveillance regarding such
information might be justified.").
20 Id
21 Id. at 1504 ("Second, the acceptance of the 'war on terror' as more than a mere sobriquet,
but as a legal concept in the United States, further supports approval of 'war-time' measures.
Unlike the 'war on drugs' or the 'war on crime,' the war on terror, or at least the use of force
pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), has been accorded the status
of 'war' for many legal purposes. . .. Thus, limits on surveillance that might be appropriate if the
purpose were ordinary law enforcement may not be appropriate if the prosecution is to occur in
military tribunals under the laws of war." (footnote omitted)).
22 Id. at 1503.
23 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Of
course the existence of a military power resting on force, so vagrant, so centralized, so necessarily
heedless of the individual, is an inherent threat to liberty. But I would not lead people to rely on
this Court for a review that seems to me wholly delusive. The military reasonableness of these
orders can only be determined by military superiors. If the people ever let command of the war
power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its
restraint. The chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the country, in the
future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries
and to the moral judgments of history.").
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security measures taken with broad public support. There is much wisdom-prac-
tical and otherwise-in his consideration of this issue.
II. REGULATORY EXACTIONS
Turn now to a completely different constitutional law topic where Professor
Funk's analysis again reflects the features noted in Part I. In 1995, Professor Funk
wrote an article considering the meaning and likely impact of Dolan v. City of
Tigard.24 Dolan dealt with the requirements the government must satisfy before im-
posing land-use exactions that would otherwise constitute takings as the price of
obtaining a development permit. 25 Dolan followed Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, in which the Supreme Court held that, as a general matter, such exac-
tions triggered Takings Clause scrutiny.26 As Professor Funk notes, Nollan "left
murky" the degree of relationship the government had to demonstrate between the
deleterious public effects posed by the requested development and the conditions
the government insisted on as a condition of allowing that development. 2 7 In Dolan,
the Court elaborated on that relationship.
In his article, Professor Funk presents two ways of "reading Dolan."28 He pre-
sents the narrative offered by the landowner, in which "she is the victim of govern-
ment extortion" and then the narrative offered by the city, in which the proposed
development would exacerbate traffic and water runoff problems that were directly
addressed by the required exactions.29
Many law review articles might be content with presenting these competing
narratives, perhaps commenting on how their differences reveal the fundamentally
indeterminate nature of law. They perhaps come down on one side or the other,
depending on where the author's sympathies lie.30 But Professor Funk does more
than that-much more. Indeed, the competing narratives constitute only the begin-
ning of an analysis that is not only careful and balanced, but rich in detail and nu-
ance.
He begins his consideration of the issue by noting and carefully considering
two factors that figured in the majority's analysis. First, he acknowledges the Court's
observation that the challenged exaction demanded in response to Ms. Dolan's re-
24 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
25 Id. at 377.
26 Nollan v. Ca. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
27 Funk, Reading Dolan, supra note 9, at 128.
28 Id. at 127.
29 Id. at 127.
30 For a general discussion of law as narrative, see Anne E. Ralph, Narrative-Erasing
Procedure, 18 NEv. L.J. 573, 575 (2018) (considering the power of narrative in litigation).
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quest for a zoning variance was imposed in the context of an adjudicatory proceed-
ing rather than as a generally applicable legislative determination.3 1 But he notes the
oddity that the adjudication involved the application of the city's master plan-a
legislative determination that normally elicits deferential scrutiny rather than the
heightened review implicated by the Court's ultimate requirement that the exactions
exhibit a "rough proportionality" to the problems the development threatened to
cause. 32 He also notes the general rule that in such adjudications the movant-that
is, the person requesting the variance-bears the burden of proof.3 3
From this granular analysis, implicating the boring topic of land-use decision
procedures rather than grand ideas of a rebirth of Lochner v. New York34 under the
aegis of the Takings Clause,35 Professor Funk perceives that Ms. Dolan's story ulti-
mately reduces to one of fair process: in this case, the application of a pre-existing
master plan to Ms. Dolan's parcel before Ms. Dolan had a chance to present the
particular facts of her case. He concludes this part of the article:
Therefore, the first factor distinguishing Do/an from ordinary cases is the ex-
istence of a master plan calling for specific pre-determined conditions appli-
cable to particular properties without relation to what might be proposed for
those properties, which conditions any significant development would trigger.
This is a substantial limitation on the scope of Dolan.36
Second, Professor Funk notes the Court's concern-which occupied much of
the Court's attention-with the fact that the exaction required Ms. Dolan to give
up tide to the land the city wanted for its greenway and bike path. But again, rather
than simply exclaiming over that factor, Professor Funk calmly notes that this issue
was decided in Nollan, the previous exactions case. 37
All told, this careful analysis suggests that Dolan may mean less than appears at
first glance. 38 But, more importantly, his analysis reaches that conclusion through a
3' Funk, Reading Dolan, supra note 9, at 133.
32 Id at 130 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994)).
33 Id. at 133.
3 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905) (using liberty of contract reasoning to
strike down a New York law limiting work hours).
35 Funk, Reading Dolan, supra note 9, at 131 (observing that Justice Stevens's dissent in
Dolan explicitly invoked Lochner).
36 Id. at 134.
3 Id. ("The only distinction between Tigard's condition and the paradigm takings case is
that the transfer is not required; it is optional with the land owner. Mrs. Dolan could avoid the
transfer merely by not engaging in the new development. This same issue had been raised and
settled in Nollan . . . . Dolan, like Nolan before it, was different from ordinary land use cases
because the government's conditional requirement of deeding the property to the government,
with its potential for out-and-out extortion, triggers the need for stricter scrutiny.").
38 Id. at 141 ("The thrust of my analysis has been to minimize the effect of Dolan. This is
not just wishful thinking; it is the clear tenor of the decision itself"). But see infra note 80 and
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careful unpacking of what was going on in the case. It is easy to be hyperbolic about
a case that appears to hamstring government power to engage in basic land use plan-
ning. But Professor Funk's careful analysis explains Dolan as embracing propositions
that are reasonable and well-established and that limit any city planner's need to
panic about its holding, even if "Dolan no doubt says something fundamental about
master plans that involve planned dedications of property as a condition of devel-
opment." 39
But Professor Funk is not done. Instead, after his measured analysis he chal-
lenges the majority's sloppy, offhand reference to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. 40 In response to the Court's (unwise) doctrinal move, he proposes a much
simpler approach--one that asks simply whether the exaction would itself be un-
constitutional, regardless of any benefit the landowner would reap from obtaining
the requested development permit, which was dangled as the compensation for the
alleged unconstitutional condition. Such an approach, he argues, would avoid the
morass of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, at least in situations like those
in Dolan. Indeed, he argues, it was essentially what the Court did in Dolan (and
Nollan) when it considered whether the condition featured an "essential nexus" to
the public harm the development threatened to cause.41
Here again, Professor Funk's good sense is evident.42 Indeed, one can contrast
accompanying text.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 135-37.
1 Id. at 136-37 ("Although the Court did not analyze it in this way in either No/lan or
Dolan, the nexus tests arguably focus on the regulation itself. Thus, in Nollan the Court assumed
for purposes of argument and in Dolan the Court flatly stated that the denial of the permit would
not constitute a taking, because the denial would substantially advance a legitimate state interest
and it would not deny the owners all economic use of the property. If the conditions involved in
those cases satisfied the nexus tests, they also would likewise not constitute takings, because the
conditions themselves would substantially advance a legitimate state interest and not deny the
owners all economic use of the property. In other words, the conditions would themselves satisfy
the constitutional requirements to avoid being a taking without just compensation. In both cases,
the Court held that the requisite nexus had not been established to avoid the Takings Clause, or
as stated in my framework, the conditions themselves failed to satisfy the constitutional
requirements necessary to avoid the Takings Clause." (footnote omitted)).
42 Indeed, one can perceive a distant echo of this same sort of analysis in one aspect of
Professor Funk's administrative law scholarship, in which he calls for a clean, straightforward
approach to the otherwise deeply murky question of when an administrative rule is a legislative
one (that is thus subject to notice-and-comment requirements) and when it is an interpretive rule
or statement of policy (that is exempt from those requirements). Rather than engaging in the
intricate and often scholastic hair-splitting that some approaches to this question have entailed,
Professor Funk has offered an elegantly simple approach: "any rule not issued after notice and
comment is an interpretive rule or statement of policy, unless it qualifies as a rule exempt from
notice and comment on some other basis." William Funk, When is a "Rule"a Regulation?Marking
a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 663 (2002). Just
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Dolan's unnecessary citation to a vague and troublesome doctrine with Professor
Funk's analysis of that case. As I have suggested, Professor Funk's analysis is the very
opposite of such sloppiness; it is precise, spare, and grounded in factual context.
Unsurprisingly, Professor Funk's approach ultimately found good company,
albeit in a different context. A decade after his article, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Ac-
ademic and Institutional Rights, Inc., a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a law con-
ditioning federal education grants on colleges providing military recruiters equal
access to on-campus job interviewing resources.43 In reaching that decision, the
Court simply bypassed the law's spending condition-and thus the unconstitutional
conditions question. Instead, the Court upheld the law simply because that condi-
tion could have been directly imposed on schools without violating the Constitu-
tion.44
But Professor Funk is still not done. Speculating about the impact of Dolan's
"rough proportionality" requirement, Professor Funk returns to his earlier distinc-
tion between adjudicative decisions responsive to the particular facts of the particu-
lar proposed development, and, on the other hand, blunt applications of a master
plan that do not take those particular facts into account. 45 Professor Funk suggests
that decisions of the former sort may well satisfy the Court's requirements-and,
just as importantly, provide firm grounding for what is otherwise the mushy "inter-
mediate scrutiny" review he sees in Dolan's "rough proportionality" requirement-
in a way that the analogous intermediate scrutiny test in sex discrimination cases is
satisfied (and more firmly grounded) when the Court determines that a gender line
is being drawn not as an unthinking repetition of old sex stereotypes, but instead as
a considered attempt to counter those stereotypes.46 It is an ingenious parallel, and
it shows Professor Funk's ability not just to get into the procedural or factual weeds
of the case but also to draw broad-stroke lessons when they are supported by the
analysis.
as Professor Funk's proposal about rulemaking cuts through the difficulty of determining the
essence of a legislative, as opposed to a non-legislative, rule, so too his suggestion about dealing
with allegedly unconstitutional exactions cuts through the murk of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.
13 Rumsfeld v. Forum Acad. Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
44 Id. at 59-60 ("This case does not require us to determine when a condition placed on
university funding goes beyond the 'reasonable' choice offered in [an earlier case] and becomes an
unconstitutional condition. It is clear that a funding condition cannot be unconstitutional if it
could be constitutionally imposed directly. .. . Because the First Amendment would not prevent
Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does
not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds." (citation omitted)).
4 Funk, Reading Dolan, supra note 9, at 138-39.
4 Id. at 138.
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III. INCITEMENT SPEECH
One final piece of scholarship reflects the type of constitutional law work Pro-
fessor Funk has done throughout his career. In 2006 Professor Funk wrote an article
discussing the First Amendment implications of online intimidation.4 7 That piece
focuses on the then-recent Nuremberg Files case, Planned Parenthood ofthe Colum-
bia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists.48 Planned Parenthood in-
volved anti-abortion activists who created a website that both provided identifying
information about abortion providers and strongly suggested that such persons
would be appropriate targets for violence. A sharply divided Ninth Circuit en banc
panel held that the public disclosure was not protected speech because it constituted
a true threat. 49
Characteristically, while Professor Funk agrees with the majority result that the
activists' speech was not protected, he does so for a more nuanced reason than the
Ninth Circuit majority. That majority concluded that the website constituted a true
threat. To those judges, it did not matter that the source of the threat may not have
been the organizers of the website but others who might be encouraged to'engage
in the violent conduct to which the website alluded with approval.o
Professor Funk does not accept the argument that the website constituted a
true threat under existing Supreme Court doctrine.5 ' Instead he argues that the web-
site should be unprotected based on what he calls "a generic balancing approach that
takes account of the value of the particular speech without regard to its subject mat-
ter ... or viewpoint."52 For Professor Funk, the components of that balancing in
Planned Parenthood are (1) the significance of the fear the speech generates5 3 and (2)
the special conditions of speech on the internet: the permanence and universal avail-
7 Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11.
48 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
4 Id. at 1088. Five judges on the 11-judge en banc panel dissented. Id. at 1062.
5o Id. at 1076 ("The dissents would change the test, either to require that the speaker actually
intend to carry out the threat or be in control of those who will, or to make it inapplicable when
the speech is public rather than private. However, for years our test has focused on what a
reasonable speaker would foresee the listener's reaction to be under the circumstances, and that is
where we believe it should remain.").
5i Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11, at 588-89.
52 Id. at 597.
53 Id. at 590 ("Whether any particular state of fear is enough to outweigh First Amendment
values is not the issue at this point. For now it is sufficient merely to establish that the
psychological reality of sensed fear is harmful enough to individuals that the state has a legitimate,
even important, maybe compelling, interest in taking action to prevent persons from causing fear
in others.").
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ability of internet speech, the ease with which such speech is made, the lack of gate-
keepers, and its anonymity. 54
For Professor Funk, these factors justify the result the Ninth Circuit reached.5 5
He argues that this result should flow not from "shoehorn[ing]" the Nuremberg
Files site into a pre-existing speech category, such as true threats, but instead by
performing the requisite weighing without any prior act of categorization. 6 To be
sure, he concedes that the inputs into his proposed balancing have also played roles
in that categorization process.5 7 Nevertheless, he eschews such categorization as itself
a necessary part of First Amendment analysis.5 8
Of course, as anyone with knowledge of First Amendment doctrine knows,
Professor Funk's call for such free-form balancing has been rejected by the current
Court. Instead, beginning in 2010, the Court has reaffirmed the traditional catego-
ries of unprotected speech.59 Indeed, it has gone farther, describing those categories
not as the result of any court-performed balancing, but instead as recognition of
5 Id. at 591-92. To be sure, Professor Funk published this article in 2006, before the rise
of Facebook and other social media sites that feature at least the realistic potential of content
moderation by third parties such as operators of such sites. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors:
The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018)
(discussing content regulatory options available to operators of social media sites such as
Facebook); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353 (2018)
(same).
5 Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11, at 597 ("The conclusion of this alternative analysis is
that the speech involved in Planned Parenthood that targeted particular individuals by identifying
them with names, addresses, and other particular details in order to induce fear in these persons
for their physical safety, under circumstances in which the identified persons would reasonably
become afraid, is not protected speech under the First Amendment.").
56 Id. ("This paper has attempted to provide an alternative analysis to a particular case
involving intimidation through the Internet. Rather than attempt to shoehorn the facts into or
distinguish the case from existing categories of unprotected speech, the analysis here has used a
generic balancing approach that takes account of the value of the particular speech without regard
to its subject matter (abortion) or viewpoint (against). While this analysis has relied, to some
degree, on the balances made in defining certain categories of unprotected (or semi-protected)
speech, it has done so on the basis that these categories are implicitly derived from this generic
balancing, rather than to show that the speech involved in the Nuremberg Files is like or not like
the speech in particular categories.").
5 Id.
5 8 Id.
5 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012); Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n,
564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (characterizing as
"startling and dangerous" the idea that unprotected categories of speech could be discovered by
an ad hoc balancing process as opposed to an inquiry into the categories of speech that were
historically unprotected).
[Vol. 23:41426
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historically unprotected categories. 60 While it has left open the possibility that ad-
ditional categories will be "discovered," 61 the Court's tone seems to be skeptical of
any such possibility.
In my view, this approach is deeply unfortunate 62 -not to mention historically
inaccurate. 63 The creation of such rigid categories leads to attempts like those of the
Ninth Circuit majority in Planned Parenthood to "shoehorn" particularly troubling
speech into such pre-existing categories rather than to candidly examine the factors
that should be relevant to whether the value of particular speech outweighs its po-
tential for harm. To be sure, such balancing carries its own risks-in particular, it
runs the risk of failing to protect speech exactly when moral or other panics trigger
the loudest calls for suppressing allegedly dangerous speech.64 But if the history of
constitutional doctrine has taught us anything, it should be that rigid categories,
whatever their benefits, inevitably start to fray at the edges when the Court confronts
difficult cases. 65 Given that speech suffuses everything that humans do--that is,
given that speech occurs essentially every time humans act66 -the perils of such doc-
trinal fraying, and ultimately, doctrinal dishonesty-seem particularly problematic
in the First Amendment context.
And io they are with Planned Parenthood. As Professor Funk notes, the major-
ity, in its categorization of the speech in question as a true threat, fails to engage the
60 Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11, at 597.
" See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472 ("Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been
historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our
case law.... We need not foreclose the future recognition of such additional categories to reject
the Government's highly manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them.").
62 See William D. Araiza, Citizens United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law Project: First
Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts, 40 STETSON L. REv. 821, 837 (2011) (concluding
that the case for rigid First Amendment rules is ultimately "disappointing").
63 See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Unprotected Speech, 128 HARV. L. REv. 2166
(2015) (offering a different explanation of the origin of the unprotected speech categories).
' See generally Araiza, supra note 62 (offering this rationale as the strongest support for a
rigid approach to free speech issues).
65 This dynamic is most obviously, although certainly not exclusively, reflected in the
Court's application of tiered scrutiny in equal protection and other contexts. See generally R.
George Wright, What ifAll the Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny Were Completely Abandoned?, 45
U. MEMPHIS L. REv. 165 (2014) (examining the manipulability of tiered scrutiny); see also Araiza,
supra note 62, at 830-33 (comparing the Court's seemingly deferential approach to stringent First
Amendment scrutiny in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), to its similarly
deferential approach to strict scrutiny in the equal protection context in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003)).
" See Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[M]uch, perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech ...
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dissent's point that true threats are normally uttered by the speaker.6 ' That is not
what was going on in Planned Parenthood, which featured speech that created a real
risk that others were going to engage in the threatening conduct. Professor Funk's
more "generic balancing"68 accounts for this distinction, without thereby rendering
the speech automatically protected despite the harm it might (indirectly) cause. The
majority's approach-both in Planned Parenthood and the Supreme Court cases re-
jecting such explicit balancing-cannot do so.
But to be clear, Professor Funk's approach is not lawless-it is not simply bal-
ancing for its own sake. Rather, Professor Funk grounds his call for balancing in
Planned Parenthood based on the tradition of balancing that he sees as underlying
the Court's existing free speech jurisprudence. 69 To be sure, the current Court
doesn't view the current set of unprotected speech categories as arising out of such
a balancing exercise; for the Court, the current set of categories is historically
based.70 But there is reason to doubt the empirical correctness of that conclusion 7 1
and certainly its foundation in logic.72
IV. COMMON THREADS
The scholarship discussed above spans a variety of doctrinal and subject-matter
areas. Indeed, Professor Funk's casebooks cover the entire field of doctrines and
topics normally covered in a first-year constitutional law course. But his scholarship
features common themes that render it enormously valuable for the study of Amer-
ican constitutional law and its forward progress.
First, Professor Funk's work is careful. He is meticulous in setting forth the
relevant doctrinal structure he's discussing. For example, his article on domestic sur-
veillance carefully traces the sequence of changes to the legal regime governing in-
telligence gathering, from Olmsteadv. United States's blanket rejection of any Fourth
67 Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11, at 588 ("Judge Kozinski's argument [in his dissenting
opinion]-that in order for something to be a threat the speaker must be suggesting some control
over the action threatened-was left unanswered by the majority.").
6s Id. at 588-89.
69 See id at 597 (observing that his proposed balancing approach "has relied, to some degree,
on the balances made in defining certain categories of unprotected (or semi-protected) speech").
70 See id
71 See generally Lakier, supra note 63.
72 See Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11, at 590 (arguing that "the psychological reality of
sensed fear is harmful enough to individuals that the state has a legitimate, even important, maybe
compelling, interest in taking action to prevent persons from causing fear in others" even if the
threats that cause such fear do not fall under the formal First Amendment category of "true
threats").
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Amendment right to be free of electronic surveillance 73 to cases 74 evaluating the
constitutionality of the Patriot Act's expansion of authority for foreign intelligence
surveillance.7 5 The path is a tricky one, combining as it does constitutional and stat-
utory provisions and featuring judicial analyses that focus on the adequacy of differ-
ing sets of safeguards as surveillance legislation was modified over time.7' But the
nuance and granularity Professor Funk's analysis features is necessary given the dif-
ficult balancing required in order fairly to mediate between legitimate foreign intel-
ligence activity and Fourth Amendment rights.
Professor Funk's analytical care is also evident in his analysis of Dolan.7 7 Rather
than simply reacting to the result or to the justices' ideological line-up and express-
ing concern for legitimate local land-use planning, Professor Funk meticulously
peels away the layers of the case to conclude that it might not mean as much as some
had feared. For example, he notes that one of the majority's main concerns seemed
to lie in the fact that the city had attempted to impose the regulatory exaction with-
out any consideration of the particular impact Ms. Dolan's proposed development
would have on the city's legitimate interests.7 8 Additionally, Professor Funk observ-
ers that Dolan's main contribution to land-use law-the "rough proportionality"
requirement to measure the relationship between the exaction and the public prob-
lem the proposed development threatened to cause-was, according to the Court,
already the law in a majority of states. 79 It is for reasons like these that'Professor
Funk was able to suggest, at least based on a reading of Dolan itself,80 that "a proper
13 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) ("The language of the [Fourth]
Amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching to the whole
world from the defendant's house or office.").
7 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719-20 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
7 See Funk, Electronic Surveillance, supra note 7, at 1492-502.
7 See id. at 1501-02 (discussing In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 717, which upheld the facial
constitutionality of the Patriot Act's changed requirements for intelligence-motivated surveillance
based on the new safeguards the Patriot Act had provided for such surveillance requests).
n Funk, Reading Dolan, supra note 9.
78 Id. at 134.
n Id. at 140.
" Id. at 139. To be sure, Professor Funk cautions that Dolan's place in a series of Takings
Clause cases the Court had decided in the years immediately preceding Dolan raised the specter
that Dolan could become simply another part of the Rehnquist Court's new focus on protecting
property rights at the expense of public land-use planning objectives. Id. at 142 ("The second
important element of Dolan can be illustrated by a list: Dolan, Lucas, Nollan, and First English
Evangelical; property owners have won the last four decisions by the Supreme Court involving
alleged regulatory takings of real property. Those who argue that these cases individually do not
have great impact nevertheless must have the sense that they are whistling past the graveyard."
(footnotes omitted)).
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interpretation of Dolan's rough proportionality test should not cause major prob-
lems for local government."81
Second, and relatedly, Professor Funk's scholarship respects facts. Professor
Funk's article on Do/an acknowledges the fact that much-although concededly not
all-of Dolan's analysis could have been found in its predecessor case, Nolan v.
California Coastal Commission.82 This fact necessarily mitigates Dolan's impact, even
if Dolan's reinforcement of Nollan's reasoning surely places that earlier case on a
more secure doctrinal foundation. A similar emphasis on facts-though with a dif-
ferent impact on legal doctrine-emerges in Professor Funk's article on the Nurem-
berg Files case.8 3 Professor Funk's article acknowledges the fact, elided by the ma-
jority in that case, that the threat at issue emanated not from the persons who posted
the doctors' names and identifying information and encouraged violent action
against them, but rather from those who acted on that encouragement and thus
actually posed the "true threat." 84 But for Professor Funk, that fact is met by the
fact that such indirect threats end up causing the same type of harm that true threat
doctrine is designed to address.8 5 To be sure, such indirect threats do not constitute
a "true threat" as the doctrine understands that term. But for Professor Funk, the
fact that they cause the same harm justifies holding that latter type of speech-the
type that was at issue in the Nuremberg Files case-similarly unprotected. 86
This focus on facts complements Professor Funk's focus on the details of doc-
trine. Both of these features of Professor Funk's scholarship reflect a detail-oriented,
incremental understanding of law-one that would not be out of place in a common
law opinion. Of course, they appear in constitutional law scholarship. Nevertheless,
as Part V explains, that fact does not diminish the importance of this attention to
detail.
Finally, Professor Funk's scholarship is balanced. Professor Funk explicitly em-
braces a balancing methodology in his Planned Parenthood true threats article, 87 but
81 Id. at 139.
82 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see Funk, Reading Dolan, supra
note 9, at 134.
3 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290
F.3d 1058 (9th Cit. 2002) (en banc); see Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11.
84 Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11, at 589 ("The doctrine that the speaker need not actually
intend to do the harm simply does not address the situation where the speaker does not even lead
the listener to believe that the speaker intends to do harm-the situation present in the
Nuremberg Files, where there was no suggestion (or understanding by readers) that the authors
of the site themselves or anyone subject to their control intended to do physical violence to the
persons named on the site. 'True threat' doctrine simply does not address this type of speech.").
85 See id.
86 Id. at 597; see supra note 56.
87 Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11, at 597; see supra note 56.
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an analogous approach informs his other scholarship as well.8 8 But this is not bal-
ance for the simple sake of balancing-or, even worse, balancing as an easy way out
of doing the hard work of legal analysis. Rather, Professor Funk's work is balanced
because, as with his foreign surveillance piece, it recognizes that profound national
values often stand on opposing sides of constitutional claims. When that occurs,
accommodation of each competing value almost necessarily requires balancing,
whatever one may call that process.
The balancing that emerges in Professor Funk's scholarship also implicates the
fact-sensitivity noted above. Simply put, balancing is not a task that is accomplished
in the abstract. Balancing competing interests requires an appreciation for the facts
underlying those interests, unless the resulting accommodation is simply done as a
categorical matter--or, even worse, if the judge pretends that the result of the bal-
ancing was foreordained by history, as the Court has done when it has maintained
that the list of unprotected speech categories in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire rep-
resent simply historically unprotected speech rather than the result of self-conscious
judicial balancing.89
Balancing as well as fact and doctrine-sensitivity are the hallmarks of Professor
Funk's scholarship. As Part V below explains, they reflect an apt and, one might
hope, an enduring approach to constitutional law, and not just constitutional law
scholarship.
V. PROFESSOR FUNK'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
This Essay closes by considering a passage from a Supreme Court opinion that
I believe well characterizes Professor Funk's constitutional law scholarship. The ex-
cerpt discusses substantive due process, a topic that this Essay has not addressed but
is apt nevertheless.
In Washington v. Glucksberg, Justice Souter, concurring in the majority's result
rejecting a due process challenge to a state ban on assisted suicide, wrote the follow-
ing:
Just as results in substantive due process cases are tied to the selections of
statements of the competing interests, the acceptability of the results is a func-
tion of the good reasons for the selections made. It is here that the value of
common-law method becomes apparent, for the usual thinking of the com-
mon law is suspicious of the all-or-nothing analysis that tends to produce legal
88 See, e.g., Funk, Electronic Surveillance, supra note 7, at 1505 (balancing Fourth
Amendment interests with the increased difficulty of government information gathering in foreign
surveillance operations as part of an analysis of what sorts of burdens government should face
when seeking foreign intelligence information).
89 See supra note 59; see also Lakier, supra note 63, at 2176.
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petrification instead of an evolving boundary between the domains of old
principles. Common-law method tends to pay respect instead to detail, seek-
ing to understand old principles afresh by new examples and new counterex-
amples. . . . "The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on
grounds which follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The
new decision must take its place in relation to what went before and further
[cut] a channel for what is to come." 90
Justice Souter is describing the methodology embraced by the younger Justice Har-
lan in his influential dissent in Poe v. Ullman,9 1 but it could be language describing
Professor Funk's scholarship.
This passage fits because, as Justice Souter writes, the acceptability of the results
reached in a given case is inevitably a function of the reasons for the choices made.
Professor Funk's scholarship is all about the practical reasons justifying one choice
over another. This approach is exemplified by his explanation of why government
may need more leeway to avoid otherwise applicable Fourth Amendment require-
ments when gathering intelligence abroad.92
The passage also serves as a fitting description of Professor Funk's approach
because it acknowledges the common-law suspicion of what Justice Souter calls "all-
or-nothing" analysis and lauds the common law's respect for detail. As this Essay
has explained, Professor Funk's scholarship respects both doctrinal detail and facts.
The work it has reviewed also reveals a suspicion of grand ideological theorizing of
the sort that characterized the Lochner-era jurisprudence that Justice Souter was try-
ing to avoid in sketching out his own theory of substantive due process review. For
example, Professor Funk's discussion of Dolan succeeds in limiting the scope of the
Court's holding by its careful attention to the factual and doctrinal detail that ap-
peared to drive, and thus cabin, that decision. 93
Finally, as with Justice Souter's approach to substantive due process, this Essay
illustrates Professor Funk's practice of grounding his analysis in what came before.
His defense of the balancing he calls for in the Nuremberg Files case is a clear ex-
ample of creating new doctrine that flows within the previously cut channel of
weighing the costs and benefits of speech.94 Indeed, Professor Funk's application of
that balancing, by turning on the similar harms caused by traditional "true threats"
and the threats indirectly encouraged by the sponsors of the Nuremberg Files site,
similarly flows within a pre-cut channel. 95 Nevertheless, just as with Justice Souter's
9o Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 770 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
9 Poe, 367 U.S. at 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92 See Funk, Electronic Surveillance, supra note 7, at 1505.
93 See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
9 See Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11, at 597; see supra note 56.
9 See text accompanying supra note 86.
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approach to due process, Professor Funk's reasoning also cuts a new channel, given
the particular analysis demanded by the facts of that particular case, including the
characteristics of the new medium of the internet.96
To quote yet another substantive due process opinion, " [t]his is surely the pre-
ferred approach." 97 Today, the Court struggles to find the balance between more
granular, less categorical approaches to constitutional law and the rigid, acontextual
approach that in the equal protection context cannot distinguish a welcome mat
from a "No Trespassing" sign,98 and that in the First Amendment context is simi-
larly unable to distinguish unchecked corporate electoral funding from Mr. Smith
Goes to Washington.99 Scholastic (in the medieval sense) distinctions compete against
those that are firmly based in common sense and good policy, although nevertheless
grounded in law-just as Justice Souter's approach in Glucksberg recognizes the ju-
dicial imperative of weighing governmental justifications against liberty infringe-
ments, but does so against the backdrop of the long tradition of substantive due
process review and the legal principles governing that review.100
Professor Funk's approach to constitutional law reflects similar imperatives.10 1
As such, it reminds us that we need not be slaves to the formulaic, abstract, deductive
approach to constitutional law that purports to be policy-neutral but that really just
hides its policy analysis under a veneer of cold logic. As Justice Souter's approach in
Glucksberg and Professor Funk's scholarship both show us, rejecting the absolutism
of, respectively, Lochner and the Court's categories-based approach to protected
speech does not equate to rejecting law. 102 For that reminder we should be grateful.
To be sure, one should not overstate the congruence between Justice Souter's
96 See id.
9 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
98 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010). Compare id. at
394 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's reliance on the "glittering generality" that
the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker's identity), with Adarand,
515 U.S. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (faulting the majority for adopting a rigid colorblindness
rule in a race-based affirmative action case rather than drawing distinctions between different types
of race-based laws depending on the motivation behind the challenged law).
100 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 764 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (explaining this approach).
101 Eg., Funk, Intimidation, supra note 11 (providing one example of how Professor Funk's
analysis reflects longstanding legal imperatives while still giving due weight to contemporary
policy balancing).
102 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 764 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The second of
[Justice Harlan's Poe] dissent's lessons is a reminder that the business of [substantive due process]
review is not the identification of extratextual absolutes but scrutiny of a legislative resolution
(perhaps unconscious) of clashing principles, each quite possibly worthy in and of itself, but each
to be weighed within the history of our values as a people.").
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analysis and the themes that surface in Professor Funk's scholarship. Ironically, forc-
ing a parallel between the two would reflect the same artificial and categorical anal-
ysis that Professor Funk's scholarship avoids. But the approach that Justice Souter
identified-careful, incremental analysis grounded in factual distinctions between
situations-is unmistakably present in Professor Funk's scholarship. This may be
the influence of Professor Funk's time working in the federal bureaucracy, where
the goal is empirically-based problem solving rather than theorizing, or it simply
may be that Professor Funk was naturally drawn to this approach. Or it may be
something else-for example, this sort of attention to detail is what naturally hap-
pens when one studies regulatory law, as Professor Funk has to great effect.
Whatever the motivation, the result shines through in his work. And we-as
scholars, as lawyers and judges, and as Americans trying to muddle our way through
a system of ordered liberty that by definition demands a careful balance of both
order and liberty-are the better for it.
